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Globalisation and Neo-liberal Economic Reforms in India: A Critical Review
Kalim Siddiqui   *  
Abstract:
The objective of this study is to analyse the impact of neo-liberal  economic  reforms  also  known
as ‘pro-market’ reforms in India. It is widely believed that  India’s  growth  acceleration  has  taken
place  mainly  due  to  changes  in  the  government’s  attitudes  towards   business   and   export
orientation rather than earlier domestic policies. This  paper  shows  that  the  turnaround  growth
took place in the early 1980s rather than the early 1990s as  portrayed  by  international  financial
institutions and media. We find the  current  discussions  overlook  other  aspects  such  as  inter-
sectoral  and  inter-regional  imbalances.  The  importance  of  the  manufacturing  sector  is   not
properly examined, which could play an important role  in  creating  jobs,  and  its  crucial  role  in
employment generation is being underplayed.
This research presents the broad macro parameters of the growth of the Indian economy in  both
periods, i.e. pre and post reforms  period,  and  also  very  briefly  comparison  is  made  with  the
colonial period, however, simply looking at  the  economic  growth  figures  might  be  misleading.
Therefore,  we  decided  to  analyse  other  variables,  such  as  inter-regional  and  inter-sectoral
changes and also look at the issue of poverty  during  pre  and  post-reform  periods.  The  author
critically examines  the  issues  of  foreign  direct  investment,  particularly  during  the  neo-liberal
period in India, also focusing on cross  region  evaluation,  drawing  out  the  patterns  discernible
from available data. The study provides an overview of the on-going debate  on  the  components
of Indian-growth and the relative importance of government policies.  The  study  has  questioned
some assertions concerning neoliberal reforms and growth in India in particular the argument that
poverty has been reduced, is problematic.
Introduction
This paper is concerned with the effect of adoption of neoliberal policies and its effect  on
India. There  have  been  various  studies  carried  out  on  this  subject  in  recent  years,
however,  we  find  there  is  a  gap  on  the  current   discussions   on   Indian   economic
liberalisation and growth. (Ahluwalia 2002; World Bank 2003) Other aspects such as inter-
sectoral  and  inter-regional  and  the  importance  of   the  manufacturing  sector   is   not
properly examined,  which  could  play  an  important  role  in  creating  jobs  in  industrial
sector, and its crucial role in employment generation is being underplayed.  (World  Bank
1997; The Economist 1997; Ahluwalia 2002) The issue  of  economic  growth  in  India  is
often   distorted   by   perceptions,   which   shape   conventional   wisdom.    This    is    a
misconception that will not only affect our analysis and understanding of the past but also
predictions about the future.
The optimistic view predicts that India  will  in  2025  catch  up  with  the  industrial  societies  and
membership of the G8. Its economy will become third largest economy in  the  world  in  terms  of
national income at purchasing power parity, and  poverty  will  be  eliminated.  The  supporters  of
neoliberal  reforms  regard  the  recent  upsurge  in  growth  primarily  gives  credence  to  capital
inflows, liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation. The neoliberal policy was expected to  boost
commodity  exports  mainly  through  exposure   to   international   competition,   thus   increasing
efficiency and to restructure economic activity in order to increase  exports.  More  than  eighteen
years experience behind us shows that those expectations are  still  not  realised.  We  find  firstly
that such views  raise  several  questions  due  to  their  incorrect  understanding  of  the  reasons
behind this recent growth. Secondly it relies on too simplistic thinking about the future prospects.
This explanation is inadequate  due  to  the  following  considerations.  First,  higher  growth  was
observed ten years before the liberalisation reforms in  1991.  Secondly,  uneven  growth  among
Indian states has accelerated. 1   Third, India’s acceleration in  the  rate  of  economic  growth
has been accompanied by growing inequality, the growing concentration of ownership  of
private industry and nearly stagnant growth in employment and manufacturing industries.
We find that along with the impressive growth particularly in  the  second  phase,  poverty
and deprivation persists for at least one-quarter of  India’s  1.1  billion  people.  A  deeper
analysis shows that recent growth has left the lives  of  most  Indians’  unimproved,  while
widening incomes, regional and sectoral disparities  have  reduced  food  availability  and
has not eliminated widespread malnutrition.
If we focus on the performance of Indian economy, it is clear that the  turning  point  in  economic
growth came in 1980, 10 years before the adoption of neo-liberal policies in 1991. For example, if
we look at the trends in GDP at constant prices during period from 1980-81  to  2004-05,  divided
this into two sub-periods: 1980-81 to 1990-91 and 1991-92 to 2004-05. A  clear  picture  emerges
that the same upturn continues, without any break throughout the period. During the  period  from
1950-51 to 1979-80, growth in GDP was 3.5 % per year while per capita GDP growth was  1.4  %
per year. During the period from 1980-81 to 2004-05 growth in GDP was 5.6  %  while  growth  in
GDP per capita was 3.6 % per year. This sharp rise in  growth  suggests  that  1980  was  turning
point. Rodrik and Subramaniam (2004) suggest that the Indian economy will grow faster over  the
next two decades and achieve growth rates around  8%  per  year.  This  optimism  is  shared  by
others such as Goldman Sachs. The high levels of institutional development such  as  democracy
and pluralism  appear  to  be  the  major  reasons  for  this  optimistic  assessment  of  the  Indian
economy. This suggests that ‘institutions’ are the most important  determinants  of  the  economic
development.
 The argument is outlined in four sections. The first section outlines briefly  the  adoption  of  new-
liberalism in  India  and  economic  growth  performances.  The  second  section,  we  critically
evaluate the issues of foreign direct investment, particularly during the neo-liberal  period
in India. The third section briefly analysis the changing perception  on  India  in  the  West
and finally section challenges the claims made for neo-liberalism that growth  will  reduce
sectoral and regional imbalances.
The adoption of Neo-liberalism and Economic Growth
Neo-liberalism claims that people  are  best  served  by  maximum  market  freedom  and
minimum intervention by the state. The role of government should be confined to creating
and defending markets. All other functions are  better  discharged  by  private  enterprise,
which will be prompted by the profit motive to supply good and services. Neo-liberalism is
a set of economic policies that have become widespread during the last 25  years  or  so.
Neo-liberalism has been imposed by powerful financial institutions  like  the  International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank. (Harvey 2005) Neo-liberalism entails  expenditure
deflating policy package at the macroeconomic and  India  has  been  no  exception.  The
external debt crisis of 1991  brought  India  close  to  default  in  meeting  its  international
payment obligation. The fiscal crisis was looming and the balance of payment  crisis  was
getting out of control. Under such circumstances India adopted neo-liberal also known as
‘market-friendly’ economic policies with support from the IMF and World Bank.  However,
the neo-liberal market reforms were not  new.  The  World  Bank  and  IMF  have  already
applied such measures in Latin America and Sub-Saharan African countries in  response
to the debt crisis in the 1980s. This new policy adopted by India  constituted  a  departure
from  previous  policy  and  increased  reliance  was  put  on  market  forces  in  resource
mobilisation.  In  addition  the  state  role’s  in  sphere  of   economic   development   was
considerably reduced. Finally, the degree of  openness  of  the  economy  was  increased
significantly. FDI and foreign technology were  given  the  leading  role  in  the  economy.
(Kurien 1994; Siddiqui 1990)
After independence in 1947, the educational  and  legal  frameworks  were  developed  to
help the market economy. Thanks to public  initiative  higher  academic  institutions  were
developed to encourage entrepreneurial and management skills along  with  science  and
technology. However,  each  of  these  changes  in  the  production  structure  was  made
possible through state intervention in the economy.  The  public  sector  played  a  crucial
role in building capital goods  industries  where  the  private  investors  were  reluctant  to
invest because large amount of capital was required, long gestation period and  high  risk
involvement.  The  public  sector  became  the  primary  instrument   for   developing   the
technological  ability  of  the   economy   such   as   fertilizers,   heavy   electrical,   power
generation plants, off shore oil exploration and so on. Even the green revolution  success
would not have been possible without the availability of finance from  nationalised  banks,
subsidised  inputs,  New  Seeds  research  conducted  into  the   public   institutions   and
government procurement prices.  In  short,  India,  like  many  Latin  American  countries,
adopted an “import substitution strategy” by making products  artificially  more  expensive
by means of tariff duties on imports. Until recently India maintained severe restrictions on
Transnational Corporations, especially in  terms  of  their  entry,  ownership,  and  various
performance requirements. (Girdner 1987)
The supporters of market liberalisation  regarding  the  recent  upsurge  in  growth  primarily  give
prominence to capital inflows, liberalisation, deregulation and  privatisation.  They  claim  that  the
Indian economy has taken off into self-sustaining growth. While in the early 1980s a small degree
of deregulation in industrial polices was also introduced. These policies  then  did  help  to  import
capital goods and thus increase productivity  in  certain  industries.  All  these  contributed  to  the
productivity increase in manufacturing sector and to economic growth. In 1991 with  the  adoption
of neo-liberal reforms, economic growth and efficiency were  seen  as  key  objectives  and  there
seems  to  have  been  a  conscious  decision  to  reduce  the  role   of   state   in   the   economic
development and increased reliance on market forces. The government was no longer guide  the
allocation  of  resources,  whether  directly  through   industrial   licensing   or   indirectly   through
intervention in  financial  sector,  these  were  left  on  the  market  forces.  Finally,  the  openness
towards foreign capital was expected to perform a strategic role in the process  of  bringing  India
closer to western economies. The change in policy did represent a shift from previous policies.
However, there is another answer, which focuses government attitudes towards private  sector  &
pro-business   policies.   There   were   several   contributing   factors    such    as    expansionary
macroeconomic policies which led to increase in aggregate demand, which in  turn  stimulated  in
rate of growth in output. Also there was a substantial  increase  in  public  investment  which  was
sustained through 1980s. Such investment improved infra  structure  and  some  de-regulation  in
industrial policies along with liberalisation of the regime for the import of capital goods appears to
have contributed to increase in productivity. (Girdner and Siddiqui  2008)  Neo-liberalism  is  quite
different from neo-mercantilism. The former  intends  to  get  greater  access  to  foreign  markets
while at the same time opening their own domestic  market  to  foreign  companies.  The  latter  is
very protective about  domestic  markets,  while  very  aggressively  pursuing  to  capture  foreign
markets for  their  products.  What  British  neo-mercantilists  adopted  in  the  19th  century  was
recently followed by East Asian countries from the 1960s. (Bagchi 1984)
In India,  the  reduction  of  trade  barriers  since  the  1990s  appears  to  be  associated  with  an
expansion of exports, consisting mostly of capital and skill intensive products, such  as  software,
services, pharmaceuticals, and so on. Total factor productivity in industry in India rose from  0.3%
in 1978-93 to 1.1% in 1993-2004. 2     However,  this  “service-led  growth”  was  seen  in  the
service sector, where annual productivity grew from an average  of  1.4%  in  1978-93  to
3.9 % in 1993-2004. Table 1 clearly  shows  that  Indian  population  more  than  doubled
since  1960,  GDP  has  increased  more  than  eightfold  since  then.  Given  that  India’s
population growth rate is much slower than three decades ago (i.e. 1.5 % in  2004-05  as
against 2.2 % in 1971-72). This means that the rise in per capita income growth rate from
1970s to current times has been even more marked.
Table1: Indian Population, GDP and GDP per capita at market prices, selected years
|Year         |Population   |GDP (in millions   |GDP per capita        |
|             |(in millions)|constant at 2000   |(constant 2000 US$)   |
|             |             |US$)               |                      |
|1960         |435          |76,283             |175                   |
|1965         |487          |91,054             |187                   |
|1970         |548          |113,606            |207                   |
|1975         |613          |130,913            |213                   |
|1980         |687          |152,621            |222                   |
|1985         |765          |198,167            |259                   |
|1990         |850          |268,023            |316                   |
|1995         |932          |345,394            |371                   |
|2000         |1,016        |457,377            |450                   |
|2005         |1,095        |641,926            |586                   |
Source: World Development Indicators 2006, World Bank
We find that  it  will  be  important  here  to  examine  the  earlier  period  growth  rates  in
historical context.  For  example,  pre-independence  growth  rates  were  much  lower  (a
period dominated by neo-liberal policies), compared to post-independence period  (1950-
80), which was often known  as  state  controlled  and  in-ward  looking  policies.  (Bagchi
1984) In historical perspective, the data shows the trends in GDP growth and  per  capita
GDP at constant prices during the period from 1900-01  to  1946-47  reveals  that  during
the first half of the 20th century,  there  was  near  stagnation  in  per  capita  GDP,  while
growth in GDP was minimal. British  economic  historian  Maddison  estimation  suggests
that the growth in national income in India was 0.8 % per year, whereas the in per  capita
income was almost negligible  at  0.4  %  per  year.  Moreover,  this  colonial  period  was
characterised by open economies, balanced budget and unregulated markets. (Maddison
1995) During the 19th Century a transfer of surplus took place from India, which  financed
industrial development  in  Britain  (Bagchi  1972).  India  was  integrated  into  the  global
economy as primary producers with very limited development and resulted in the process
of de-industrialisation and a substantial labour reserve being created.
The available data indicates that the turnaround came in the early 1950s.  The  trend  in  national
income and per capita income, at constant prices, during the period from  1900  to  1947  reveals
that during first half of  the  20th  century,  the  economy  witnessed  near  stagnation  in  per
capita income while  growth  in  national  income  was  negligible  as  shown  in  Table  2.
Another estimate by Sivasubramonian  indicates  that  in  real  terms,  the  growth  in  the
national income was 1 % per year, whereas the growth in per capita income  was  0.2  %
per year (see Table 2).
Table 2: Rates of Economic Growth in the India. (%)
|Period/Sectors                       |Sivasubramonian estimates    |
|First half of 20th Century           |                             |
|1900-01 to 1946-47                   |                             |
|Primary sector                       |0.4                          |
|Secondary sector                     |1.7                          |
|Tertiary sector                      |1.7                          |
|National income                      |1.0                          |
|Per capita income                    |0.2                          |
|Second half of 20th century          |                             |
|1950-51 to 2004-05                   |                             |
|Primary sector                       |2.5                          |
|Secondary sector                     |5.3                          |
|Tertiary sector                      |5.4                          |
|GDP total                            |4.2                          |
|GDP per capita                       |2.1                          |
Source:  Sivasubramonian  (2000)  National  Accounts  Statistics  of  India,   and   Central   Statistical   Organisation,   various   years,
Government of India.
During the colonial period the record in assisting the development and  economic  growth
was rather very insignificant. For instance, in 1947, the year the  British  left  India,  about
84 % Indian were illiterate and 85 % of the economy was rural. The  colonial  legacy  was
summarised by the Cambridge Economic History of India in such words:
Capital formation (about 6 percent of the NDP)  was  inadequate  to  bring  about
rapid improvement in per capita income, which  was  about  one-twentieth  of  the
level then attained in developed countries in developed  countries.  The  average
availability of food was not only deficient in quantity and quality, but, as  recurrent
famines  underscored  so  painfully,  also  precarious.  Illiteracy   was   about   84
percent and majority (60 %) of the children in the 6 to 11 years age did not attend
school;  mass  communicable  diseases  (malaria,  smallpox  and  cholera)  were
widespread and, in the absence of a good public  health  service  and  sanitation,
mortality rates (27 per 1000) were very high. The problems of poverty,  ignorance
and disease were aggravated by the unequal distribution  of  resources  between
groups and regions.  (Kumar and Desai 1983) 3
At the time of independence, India inherited a colonial economy. It  was  largely  agrarian
and industries were limited to textiles, some  steel  and  chemicals,  sugar,  cement.  The
import of new technology was limited, and  export  items  consisted  of  low  value  added
items like cotton, tea, jute, spices etc. A transformation of this colonial economy could not
occur with the spontaneous operation of the market. The state  had  to  take  lead  in  the
production of capital goods industries and the institutional reforms in  agriculture  enabled
the country  to  increase  agriculture  production.  During  the  1950s  and  1960s  various
agrarian legislation were passed  but  did  not  succeed  in  breaking  land  concentration.
While it did encourage  large  farmers  to  become  capitalist  farmers  and  also  the  rich
tenants acquired ownership rights over land, marginal and  landless  agricultural  workers
did  not  benefit  from  it.  Later  through  the  Green  revolution  did  increase  the  overall
agricultural output and made the country self-sufficient in food grains.
However, the overall GDP trends and GDP per capita at constant prices from  1950  to  2004  are
dramatically different.  There  was  a  steady  growth  in  both  GDP  and  GDP  per  capita  since
independence. For example, between 1950-51 and 2004-05 the GDP growth  was  4.2  %,  while
GDP growth per capita income 2.1 % per year. Looking at sector  wise  growth  from  1991-92  to
2004-05, growth rates in the primary sector and the secondary  sector  was  slower  while  during
the same period growth in the tertiary sector was higher (see Table 2).
During the period between 1980-81 and 2004-05 a clear trend of rise in growth rates is observed,
a decade earlier than the economic liberalisation  began.  For  instance,  during  the  period  from
1950-51 to 1979-80, GDP growth rates was 3.5 %  while  in  GDP  per  capita  1.4  %  pear  year.
During the period from 1980-81 to 2004-05 growth in GDP was 5.6 %, while per capita was 3.6 %
per annum. As we see in the next table that there was a sharp increase in growth rates,  not  only
aggregate but also sectoral, suggesting that 1980-81 was the turning point.
The Central Statistical Organisation (CSO) has estimated the GDP growth averages were  8.7  %
from 2003-04 to 2006-07  per  annum.  This  optimism  led  to  government  to  claim  that  recent
acceleration in growth is not a short-lived phenomenon. Underlying this turnaround in growth is  a
sudden rise in investment in the economy. Compared with  an  average  level  of  24.6  %  during
1999-2000 to 2002-03, the gross domestic investment rate rose to 28.2 %  in  2003-04  and  then
further rose to 35.9 % in 2006-07 – a more than 40 % increase from its previous level.
The question arises: what factors may have induced this turnaround.  Government  cites  exports
and external markets as stimulus to this rapid growth in investment. However, we should not only
look at gross value of exports  of  goods  and  services  but  also  net  exports  (i.e.  export  minus
imports). The reason is that any extra export markets that increase could be neutralised by rise in
imports from overseas markets.  Once we take into account of the net export data, we find that  it
has been consistently negative throughout post-economic reform period.
In recent years the public sector investment has been growing at slower rates and its  share  in
total capital formation (at constant prices) has actually  fallen  from  29  %  in  2001-02  to
22.5 % in 2005-06, whereas the private corporate sector has risen from 22.5 %  to  40  %
during the same period.  Moreover, the growth has been accompanied by an increase  in
domestic savings rates, meaning an increase in incomes of those who have surpluses  to
save i.e. an increase in income inequality. And this would have  implications  for  patterns
of demand and consumption  as  well.  Finally,  the  easy  access  to  credit  with  relaxed
requirements has not just fuelled a construction boom in land-property, housing,  etc.  but
also resulted in a sharp increase in credit financed consumption demand. The fact that in
India growth seems to have been based on easy access to credits, consumption induced
and service dominated has implications for its long period sustainability. (Patnaik 2000)
Capital in-flows
India needs to draw a lesson from the 1997 East  Asian  financial  crisis  and  the  danger
associated with a world dominated by fluid finance. This experience tells us if the country
chose to liberalise his financial policies to attract  financial  investors  to  its  markets,  the
country will be prone to boom-bust cycles,  with  adverse  impact  for  economic  stability.
There is  recent  increase  in  developing  country  exposure,  despite  a  high  degree  on
concentration of flows to developing countries, implying high exposure to a few countries.
 In a situation when an economy is  experiencing  upturn,  under  such  situation  the  risk
assessments may  underestimate  the  risk,  when  investments  are  booming,  and  over
estimate when markets turn downwards. (Singh 2001) Liberalisation is expected to  bring
in a large amount of foreign investment. What we find in India after liberalisation  most  of
the  ‘hot  money’  was  interested  in  speculation.  We  have  witnessed  ‘globalization  of
finance’ rather than a ‘globalization of production’. Under these circumstances  economic
stagnation may be expected rather than rapid industrial growth.
Developing countries’ drive to attract FDI compels them to open  themselves  up  to  international
capital flows. This pushes them into the mercy of  international  finance  ‘hot  money’  finances.  If
finance can flow in and out as they wish, then the country has to make every effort to  keep  itself
attractive and ‘confidence-worthy’. To stay competitive, the country  has  to  offer  higher  interest
rates to offset relative disadvantages and low tax rates, because higher tax  rates  might  frighten
off capital. (Singh 2001)
Foreign  direct  investment  the  1990s  became  a  predominant  source  of  external  finance  for
developing countries. At the same time, the need for external finance became greater. There was
increased competition among developing countries to attract FDI. As a result,  the  power  shifted
away from national governments towards multinational corporations. Ajit Singh finds  (2001)  ‘FDI
as a source of long term finance  for developing countries indicates that  unless  it  is  adequately
regulated by their governments, in particular circumstances of  these  countries,  where  they  are
subject to frequent internal and external shocks, it would  lead  to  short  and  long  term  financial
fragility.’ (Singh 2001:1)
Capital inflows of both portfolios and direct foreign investment have risen to a  combined  total  of
$17 billion. However, the trade deficit of both goods and services has increased because of rapid
increase in oil imports i.e. $40 billion, up by 40%. Along with it  foreign  exchange  reserves  have
kept rising.
 One of the key objectives of  the  neo-liberal  policy  of  the  government  in  opening  the  capital
account was that capital inflows would increase output and export growth. It would be  interesting
to  examine  what  it  has  done  towards  this  goal.   The  supporters  of  the  neoliberal   policies
suggested that lowering the barriers to capital inflows would increase  growth,  as  did  happen  in
East Asia. Mazumdar (2005) argues that,  ‘after  1993,  when  the  capital  account  was  partially
liberalised,  it  was  hoped  that  capital  inflows   would   contribute   towards   economic   growth.
However, result from our model suggests that capital inflows have not contributed towards  either
industrial production or economic growth.’ (Mazumdar 2005:2188)
Much of the FDI inflows  into  India  concentrated  in  the  service  sector  (telecommunications  in
particular) in response to liberalisation policies designed to attract FDI, such as easing ownership
restrictions. FDI outflows from Indian are also on the  rise  due  to  increasing  cross-border  M&A
purchases by Indian companies mainly in the rich countries. Since 2004, FDI flows from  India  to
United Kingdom exceeded flows from the UK to India. Tata  acquired  the  Dutch  steel  company
Corus and more recently Jaguar and Land Rover in the UK. Neo-liberalism is a policy pursued by
an economy where state acts  in  accordance  with  the  interests  of  big  businesses  and  global
finance with which the upper sections of Indian elites make common cause. These  sections  see
their own interest no longer contrary to the interest of metropolitan capital. (Girdner and  Siddiqui,
2008)
Total in flows of FDI into Asia, China and Hong Kong were able to increase their share over 68 %
in 2002, with China receiving over 45 % of the total FDI flows to Asia and Hong Kong over 22  %.
They are only to be followed by Singapore whose shares have fallen from 25 %  in  1991  to  only
8.5 % in 2002. The amount of FDI flows to India only modestly from 0.66 % in 1999  to  3.3  %  in
2002. (Reserve Bank of India 2006; Desai 2003)
Changing Perception in the West
Earlier the perceptions were very different. Indian economic policy was seen in the  West
an example of failure. Slow growth and continuing poverty represented  failure.  But  after
the adoption of neoliberal policies, there was a dramatic change in  the  perception.  Now
India is seen as successful story, if not a role model. The current  picture  of  India  in  the
Western world is completely different from the earlier image as poverty,  slums,  illiteracy,
snake charmers etc. The more recent image calls India a ‘knowledge  society’  despite  a
third of its population being illiterate. The opinion in rich countries about the  prospects  of
the Indian economy has changed enormously since early 1990s. This is  because  India’s
huge  progress  in  Information  Technology  (IT)  and  also  new   thinking   in   economic
development in respect to policy.
In 1980s perceptions were that failure was associated with India  e.g.  inefficient  industrialisation,
state regulation and slow growth. However, by 2002 (i.e. two decades later) the same India came
to be seen as a star performer. For some the impressive economic  performance  combined  with
strong ‘institutions’ such as political democracy and freedom and more  recently  the  adoption  of
free markets and openness have been the prime factors behind this recent upsurge in growth.
According to the proponents of neoliberal, the rapid growth is primarily  due  to  liberalisation  and
openness. (Srinivasan 1999; World Bank 2003) Further it was  said  that  50  years  were  wasted
and according to them, the free market polices of 1991, which reduced the role of state, cut  back
on public sector, increased the openness in the economy,  dismantled  price  controls  to  rely  on
market forces, unleashed economic growth and finally led to dramatic  increase  in  growth  rates.
(Ahluwalia 2002)
For instance, the picture of India’s macro economic performance  in  the  early  1980s  was  seen
less than optimism and perhaps, best captured in these words:
A review of the economic development of India in the last  three  decades  reveals
an  astonishing  fact:  a  large  number  of  the  indicators   of   development   have
remained  stuck  at   very   unsatisfactory   levels…   The   stability   of   numerous
parameters would not be a  matter  of  concern  but  for  the  fact  that  their  stable
values epitomise a large and a  growing  mass  of  unrelieved  suffering…  For  32
years  the  rate  of  growth  of  national  income  has  been  stagnating   around   a
miserable mean of about 3.5 %. This rate keeps India as low as 71st in  the  list  of
104   countries   ordered   according   to   the   rate   of   growth   in    income    per
capita. (Krishna 1984:62-63)
Now two decades later, it appears the whole academic discourse has radically changed  and  the
most optimist assessment of post-reform India’s macroeconomic performance was presented as:
During 1980-90, the rate of growth increased to 5.8 % and was exceeded  by  only
eight out of 113 countries. During 1990-98, the growth rate further increased to 6.1
% was exceeded by only 9 out of 131 countries. Only after the growth  accelerated
in the  1980s,  was  there  a  significant  declining  trend  in  poverty,  a  trend  that
appears  to  have  continued  after  the  recovery  from  1991   crisis   and   reform.
(Srinivasan 1999)
Further  the  proponents  of  neoliberal  economic  reforms  claimed  that   the   economic
reforms initiated in 1991 besides  increasing  economic  growth  also  to  reduce  poverty.
According to Lal, ‘(the)…dispute about the poverty numbers in  India  merely  reflects  the
fact that rapid growth has not occurred or has not been sustained to make a marked dent
on poverty.  The  stalled  reforms  have  failed  to  raise  growth  rate  appreciably.  Some
estimates that I have made show that if the growth rate rises to  9-10  %  that  China  has
seen, by 2006 the poverty ratio can fall from its  current  rate  over  30  %  to  just  over  5
percent.’ (Lal 1999) These academic views reflect the dramatic change in the  perception
about India’s economic performance within a short period.
Media in the West  is  projecting  India  as  emerging  an  economic  superpower.  The  headlines
describe India as the ‘back  office  of  the  world’.  The  global  press  often  reports  about  India’s
economic boom, with high expectations and admiration for its consumer elites.  The  euphoria  by
the  international  financial  institutions  over  India’s  growth  seems  to  have  total  ignorance  of
realities such as the rising number of farmer’s suicides. According to government records 100,
248 farmers committed suicide between 1993 and 2003. (Patnaik 2007) These happened
not  in  backward  states  but  developed  states   in   terms   of   agriculture   output   and
productivity.  The  acute  agrarian  distress  caused  by  falling  returns   from   agriculture
(especially food crops), coupled with debts and usurious interest  rates  and  occasionally
crop failure. (Patnaik 2007)
It will be interesting to quote a Financial  Times  journalist  based  in  New  Delhi  about  his  most
recent observation on poverty: 
From the stunted and wasted frames of landless, they would  have  observed  how
malnutrition rates, already higher than in parts of sub-Saharan Africa, are rising  in
many places, as wages lag behind soaring food  prices.  They  would  have  learnt
how  120  million  families,  who  depend  on   land   for   subsistence   agriculture,
generating no marketable surplus from one season  to  the  next,  live  in  terror  of
expropriation  by  state  governments  operating   land   scams   in   the   name   of
development. (Johnson 2007)
Inter-Sectoral and Regional Changes
In this section we will discuss  some  of  the  empirical  facts  about  the  contribution  and
importance of manufacturing and service sector in Indian economy since the adoption  of
economic reforms. Table 3 provides some basic information about sectoral growth.  After
1991,  in  India  the  growth  rate  of  service  sector  became  much   faster   than   either
manufacturing or agriculture.  Despite  the  higher  growth  of  service  sector,  its  overall
significance in  the  economy  is  limited.  For  example,  the  service  sector  accounts  at
present for less than 1 % of the GDP  and  employs  less  than  1  million  people  in  total
labour force of about 500 million. However, the IT sector makes a significant  contribution
to the balance of payments. Despite its fast growth, it  is  only  able  to  employ  educated
people. Only 5 %  Indian  youth  receive  college  education,  which  means  employment
needs of uneducated youth are not going to be met by IT sector growth.
Table 3: Sectoral Economic Growth since 1951 (% per year)
| Sector/Period    |1950-51 to  |1980-81 to   |1980-81 to  |1991-92 to |
|                  |1979-80     |2004-05      |1990-91     |2004-05    |
|Primary sector    |2.2         |2.9          |3.1         |2.5        |
|Secondary sector  |5.3         |6.1          |6.7         |6.0        |
|Tertiary sector   |4.5         |7.1          |6.6         |7.8        |
|GDP total         |3.5         |5.6          |5.4         |5.9        |
|GDP per capita    |1.4         |3.6          |3.2         |4.1        |
Source: National Accounts  Statistics  of  India,  2005;  Government  of  India  Economic  Survey,
various issues (http://indiabudget.nic.in) Primary sector  includes  agriculture,  forestry  &  fishing.
The secondary sector includes: manufacturing, mining, electricity, gas, construction.  The  tertiary
sector includes: transport, insurance, banking, real estate, services, hotel restaurants, social  and
personal services.
We also find that importance of agriculture sector is underestimated by the supporters  of
neo-liberal reforms. Agriculture provides employment even now to about 60 % of the total
labour force in the country. However, when we  look  at  the  data  we  find  that  share  of
agriculture sector in the  gross  domestic  product  (GDP)  has  been  falling  continuously
during the decades as follows 1990-91 -13 %; 2000-01 –  26  %;  2001-02  –  24  %;  and
2007-08 – 17.5 %. Compared  with  the  sharp  decline  in  the  share  of  the  agricultural
sector  in  GDP,  the  proportion  of  the  workforce  depending  on  agriculture  has   only
declined marginally from 69 % in 1991 to 58 % in 2001. Thus it means that the per capita
earning capacity in agriculture sector has fallen, forcing the farmers into increased  debts
and eventually leading to suicide.
Some  suggest  that  because  of  technological  development,  services  in  future  may   replace
manufacturing as the engine of growth  in  developing  countries.  Therefore,  in  changing  global
environment  the  service  sector  could   play   leading   role   and   replace   the   importance   of
manufacturing sector as a new dynamic force in economic  development.  Manufacturing  despite
some pocket of excellence, is struggling  to  become  globally  competitive  and  failing  to  play  a
traditional role as a sponge for surplus  rural  labour  in  India.  Experiences  of  other  developing
countries suggest that economic growth has often been led by the manufacturing sector  such  as
South Korea, Taiwan and more recently China.
We find it crucial to revisit the role of manufacturing sector in economic development. In  Kaldor’s
model (1967) assumes that the development of manufacturing sector is seen as key to  country’s
long term economic growth. Kaldor emphasises the role of manufacturing sector in  his  structural
theory of growth model for developing countries. He took  account  of  both  supply  and  demand
side factors in the economy. According to  him  the  manufacturing  goods  have  greater  income
elasticity of demand compared to the agricultural goods which is considered to have  low  income
elasticity of demand for its products. He also assumed  similar  rate  of  growth  of  productivity  in
agriculture and industry because the technological advancement in  agriculture  tend  to  be  both
labour and land saving. The growth of productivity would  be  lower  in  services  than  agriculture
and manufacturing. The higher levels of income will have greater income elasticity of demand  for
services than manufacturing.
However, this effect may be  nullified  due  to  faster  rise  of  productivity  in  manufacturing  than
services. Kaldor further suggested that as economy progresses,  there  will  be  a  shift  of  labour
force engaged in agriculture towards manufacturing, which  will  lead  to  increase  productivity  in
both sectors. This will also lead to the demand of less labour force in agriculture at higher outputs
due to increased  productivity.  Moreover,  the  technical  progress  in  manufacturing  will  beside
increasing the productivity of agriculture by producing higher capital inputs  and  will  also  benefit
the balance of trade through increased exports. India faces two  major  challenges  namely  large
scale under employment and unemployment. Its labour force is growing at an average  rate  of  2
% per year. The task to find job for existing unemployed and under employed is immense.
Table 4: Growth of Employment by Sectors in India per annum (selected years)
|             |Employed     |           |            |Annual growth rates %    |
|Industry     |workers in   |           |            |                         |
|             |millions (%) |           |            |                         |
|             |1983         |1993       |2000        |1993        |2000 (post  |
|             |             |           |            |(pre-reform |reform      |
|             |             |           |            |period)     |period)     |
|Primary      |208.99       |245.16     |239.83      |1.6         |-0.34       |
|             |(69%)        |(65.5%)    |(60.4%)     |            |            |
|Secondary    |41.66        |55.53      |66.91       |2.91        |3.14        |
|             |(13.8)       |(14.8)     |(16.8)      |            |            |
|Tertiary     |52.11        |73.76      |90.26       |3.53        |2.42        |
|             |(17.2)       |(19.7)     |(22.7)      |            |            |
|Total        |100          |100        |100         |2.04        |0.98        |
|Employment   |             |           |            |            |            |
Source: Adopted from S. Joshi (2004) ‘Tertiary Sector-Driven Growth in India-Impact  on  Employment  and  Poverty’,  Economic  and
Political Weekly, 11th September. 
Table 4 provides information on growth and share  of  employment  by  sectors  in  Indian
economy over the two decades. The table shows  that  share  of  primary  sector  in  total
employment was much greater than in GDP i.e. 60.4 % compared with 27 % of the  GDP
in 2000. There was a small increase in the share of secondary sector in the  employment
from 13.8 % in 1983 to 16.8 % in 2000
There is seems to be no clear linkages between growth and reduction in the  poverty  levels.  We
will look at both pre and post neo-liberal reform period that despite rapid growth the  trickle  down
effect failed to materialise. The Indian economy in the post reform period has emerged as one  of
the fastest growing economies of the world. GDP growth during the 2002-07 averaged  7.6,  what
is  more  important  that  the  higher  growth  rates  have  been  achieved  along  with   significant
improvement in macroeconomic stability. However, higher growth has not  been  inclusive.  While
India is now the second highest GDP growth rates in the world, but it  ranks  in  terms  of  Human
Development Index (a composite measures of life expectancy, adult literacy  etc)  has  slipped  to
128 among 177 countries in 2007 from 126 in 2006.
India’s  disparities  scenario  is  pattern  of  wealth  disparities  in  the  liberalisation  period.    The
National Sample Survey  data  shows  that  there  was  a  perceptible  increase  in  inter-personal
wealth inequality in India between 1991 and 2002. The top 10 % of the  population  increased  its
share of total national wealth to 52 %, while the share of bottom to 10 % fell to just  0.21  %.  The
present growth has potential for widening in-equality. It is claimed that  percentage  of  population
below the poverty level has fallen from 36 % in 1994  to  27  %  in  2005,  however,  the  absolute
number of total poor stood at 302 million in 2005, accounting a quarter of world poor. Poverty and
widespread malnutrition and illiteracy have still to be addressed. For example, in  2005  about  40
% adult suffered from chronic energy deficiency, 35 % workers were illiterate, 20 % workers were
in the households below the poverty line, leading to low productivity of labour.  (Das 1999)
A decline in the growth of the agriculture sector during the 1990s has  been  noted  and  this  has
continued. (Patnaik 2007)  This decline has been marked by recent  declines  in  yields  per
hectare for a number of  food  crops.  Indian  agriculture  is  currently  passing  through  a
crisis. The annual  growth  of  agricultural  growth  output  decelerated  from  3.08  %  per
annum during the period 1980-81 to 1991-92 to 2.38  %  per  annum  during  1992-93  to
2003-04. The  post  reform  period  there  had  been  a  sharp  decline  in  the  per  capita
availability of foodgrains (Bhalla 2007:67)  Disparities  between  primary,  secondary  and
tertiary sectors are growing alarmingly. An analysis of  the  data  for  the  period  between
1990-91 and 2003-04 suggests that governmental  expenditure  in  agriculture,  including
public investment and subsidies for fertilizers, have been significantly undercut  in  recent
years. It is widely agreed that growth in agriculture, for the  production  of  both  food  and
non-food  crops,  is  based  on  a  number  of   assumptions   pertaining   to   government
expenditures, input prices, rainfall, price behaviour and so on.
The achievement in human development in India which is revealed through measures  of  Human
Development Index (HDI) – a rank 124 out of 173 countries in the year 2000. While the HDI is  an
indicator of achievement, the Human Poverty  Index  (HPI)  provides  a  measure  of  deprivation.
Here India rank of 55 out of 88 is  the  lowest  in  the  line  of  sub-Saharan  African  nations.  The
percentage of people below the international poverty line of 1 US$ a day is  44  %  in  India.  It  is
one of the highest and its magnitude is certainly alarming.  According  to  such  estimates,  Indian
poor numbered about 450 millions out of estimated total 1.2 billion in the world.
Table 5: The size and share of upper middle class (including rich class)
|                 |2001-02          |2005-06          |2009-10          |
|Size (millions)  |62               |67.26            |173              |
|Share            |6.1 %            |8.9 %            |14.5 %           |
Source: National Council of Applied Economic Research, New Delhi, 2006
Despite the optimist projection about increase in the number of middle class in India (see
Table 5), the large proportions of Indian  people  have  been  left  out  of  the  benefits  of
recent economic growth as capitalism function on the principle of exclusion.  With  higher
rate  of  growth  there  appears  to  be  rise  in  inequalities  as  well.  Some  people  have
benefited from this growth, while the large numbers of people are being left out.
The critical question is whether  rapid  growth  (proponents  of  neoliberalism  claims  that  due  to
economic reforms started in the 1991) has led to faster decline in the proportion of the population
below the poverty line. In terms of absolute numbers, those below the poverty line  declined  from
324 million in 1993-94 to 315.5 million in 2004-05. But over a third of the population  still  remains
in poverty in spite of the claim that the Indian economy has taken off  into  self-sustaining  growth
rates.
Rapid industrialisation in 1950s hoped to absorb the surplus labour force in the  industrial  sector,
but this did not happen. Six decades later still, almost 60 %  of  the  labour  force  in  India  is  still
engaged in the primary sector contributing about 21 %  of  the  total  GDP.  Manufacturing  sector
employs 17 % of the labour force producing 27 % of the  GDP.  It  is  quite  unique  for  India,  but
China is today a third largest country of the world for manufactured commodities still has 49 %  of
its labour force engaged in agriculture producing only 15.2 % of GDP. Industry  engages  only  22
% of the labour force contributing 52.9 % of the  GDP.  (The  Economist  2007:66-67)  It  appears
that good macroeconomic indicators have failed to create improved  prospects  for  rural  poor  to
acquire productive assets, gainful employment or an increase in their income.
During the 1960s the emphasis in India was towards agriculture development, which is known  as
‘Green Revolution’. The aim was to increase the output of foodgrains. It was suggested  the  food
shortage has led the poor to go without  food  and  increase  in  foodgrains  output  was  seen  as
crucial element to remove poverty and hunger.  The solution was seen  by  providing  agricultural
inputs to better endowed farmers and regions would lead to  increase  in  marketable  agricultural
surplus. The support was provided in the form of subsidised prices of  inputs  such  as  fertilizers,
new seeds,  water,  electricity,  credits  and  also  higher  procurement  prices  for  farmers.  As  a
consequence, in the 1980s there was a rapid increase in agricultural products, which  did  ensure
food security (given the very low income base of the large proportion of India’s population). But  it
did not lead to significant reduction in poverty.
The Indian economy has been growing around 7-8  %  for  the  last  two  decades.  But  this  high
growth, the manufacturing sector instead of drawing surplus labour force from the primary sector,
is itself experiencing a downward trend in labour absorption. So  the  government  and  neoliberal
economists over optimism has not been realised. In 1991  total  employment  of  both  public
and private sector was 26.73 million, which rose to 28.28 million  in  1997.  Since  then  it
has been continuously declining. In 2004, the figure was 26.4, which was 0.3 million  less
than in 1991 when liberalisation was started. Moreover,  there  is  a  gradual  increase  in
temporary jobs or causal employment.
India achieved impressive growth in food production after the adoption of green revolution,  which
led to increase in per capita production of food grain from 183 kg 1971 to 207  kg  in  1996,  even
as the India’s population increased by more than 50 %. (see Table 6) However, after the 1995-06
the food production failed to keep pace with population growth. Per capita  production  of  cereals
has declined by 17 kg  and  pulses  production  3  kg  during  the  last  decade.  This  could  pose
serious threat to food security of the country. Some academics point out that this is due to dietary
diversification due to increase in income levels,  the  consumers  have  shifted  their  preferences
from cereals to livestock products. (Pengali and  Khwaja  2004)   However,  in  order  to  increase
production of livestock requires high growth in the use of grain as feed for  livestock.  Because  of
these reasons food grains continue to be  important  for  food  security  and  any  decline  in  their
production will push the prices, which will have adverse impact on poor people.
Table 6: Per Capita Production of Food grains 1971 to 2007 (in kg).
|Period           |Cereals          |Pulses           |Food grains      |
|1971-75          |164              |19               |183              |
|1976-80          |172              |18               |190              |
|1981-85          |179              |17               |196              |
|1986-90          |182              |16               |198              |
|1919-95          |192              |15               |207              |
|1996-2000        |191              |14               |205              |
|2001-2005        |177              |12               |189              |
|2004-07          |175              |12               |186              |
Source: Economic Survey, New Delhi; Agricultural Statistical at a Glance, Ministry of Agriculture. New Delhi.
Why the high growth rates fail to be inclusive? Output can be divided  into  three  groups:
agriculture, manufacturing and services. The share of agriculture  in  GDP  declined  from
57 % in 1950-51 to 25 % in 199-2000  and  further  to  20  %  in  2004-05.  The  share  of
agriculture sector in total workers, however, declined only from 76 % in 1950-51 to  57  %
in 2004-05. It clearly shows that a large number of people still rely on agriculture for  their
livelihood. However, the most disturbing fact is that growth rate in agriculture  declined  in
recent years. When the over all growth rate  of  the  economy  was  6  %,  the  agriculture
sector  growth  was  only  3.2   %   per   annum   during   the   period   of   1985-90.   The
corresponding figures were 6.7  %  and  4.7  %  in  the  liberalisation  period  of  1992-97.
During the so-called high growth period of 2002-07, the GDP  growth  rates  increased  to
7.6 % per annum, while the agriculture growth  rates  declined  to  2.3  %.  These  figures
clearly show us that why a large section of the population is still not included the  benefits
of growth.
Another point is that high growth rates after adoption of liberalisation was  driven  by  the  service
sector. Its share in GDP is now well over 50 % (compared to  agriculture’s  20%)  and  its  growth
rates tend to exceed the over all growth rates. The service sector has wide variations in  earnings
and skills (e.g. from street vendors to the corporate personal) While majority in the sector are low
earners, there is a tiny minority of exceptionally high earners.  It is the latter’s earnings that inflate
the share of the sector in GDP.  This segment also has a high propensity to generate demand for
elite services. For example, highly paid  executives  give  rise  to  highly  paid  doctors,  solicitors,
accountants etc. thus high valued service sector will  have  tendency  to  perpetuate  inequalities.
The increased reliance of market forces would result in state further  withdrawing  from  its  social
and economic role, which would make it difficult to achieve inclusive growth.
It is crucial to examine the neo-liberal policy’s impact on regional development in  India.  We  find
that the economic reforms carried out during the last decade show that one  of  its  major  victims
has been balanced regional  growth.  Private  investments  have  increasingly  gone  to  relatively
developed  regions  that  have  better  infrastructure.  Five  major  states  viz.   Andhra   Pradesh,
Gujarat, Maharastra, Karnatka and Tamil Nadu, that together account for  less  than  one-third  of
India’s population, accounted for almost two-third of the private investment during the 1991-2001.
(Baru 2004) The same states also benefited from over 60 % of the  commercial  bank  credit  and
financial flows from  the  national  financial  institutions.  While,  in  contrast,  the  less  developed
regions of seven states, viz. Assam, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh,  Orissa,  Rajasthan,  Uttar  Pradesh
and West Bengal together accounting for 55 % of India’s population received less  than  30  %  of
the private investment and a similar share of bank credit  and  other  institutional  finances  during
the same period. (Kurian 2002)
The better performing states are in western and southern regions  of  the  country  and  the  poor-
performing  states  are  in  northern  and  eastern  regions  of  the   country.   (See   Table   7)   A
concomitant of poor economic and socio-demographic performance  is  poverty  and  deprivation.
The latest  estimates  of  poverty  in  the  country  and  its  spatial  spread  for  1999-2000  clearly
indicates this. While the poverty ratio for the country as a whole is 26.1 %, it is high as 33.1 % for
the less-developed states and as low as 17.9 % for  the  developed  states  as  a  group.  (Kurian
2002)
Table 7: Economic Growth in Major Indian States, 1980-2004. (%)
|States           |1980-90          |1990-2004        |1980-2005        |
|Andhra Pradesh   |4.81             |5.33             |5.1              |
|Assam            |3.91             |3.00             |3.4              |
|Bihar            |5.20             |4.2              |4.6              |
|Gujarat          |5.71             |8.11             |7.1              |
|Haryana          |6.68             |6.63             |6.65             |
|Himachal Pradesh |6.10             |6.44             |6.3              |
|Karnatka         |6.10             |6.38             |6.3              |
|Kerala           |4.50             |5.69             |5.2              |
|Madhya Pradesh   |5.18             |4.74             |4.9              |
|Maharastra       |5.98             |5.92             |5.95             |
|Orissa           |5.85             |3.94             |4.7              |
|Punjab           |5.14             |4.14             |4.6              |
|Rajasthan        |7.17             |5.68             |6.3              |
|Tamil Nadu       |6.35             |5.70             |5.97             |
|Uttar Pradesh    |5.88             |3.76             |4.64             |
|West Bengal      |5.20             |7.12             |6.32             |
|All India        |5.60             |5.90             |5.8              |
Source: Economic Survey various issues. Government of India
India’s most populous states, namely the Hindi-speaking region of north and central India
continue to represent the least economic developed region of India. There is a  wealth  of
literature on regional disparities focusing on economic pre-condition for growth and much
of recent literature on regional patterns of growth in India is concerned with the impact  of
liberalisation  and  economic  reforms  on  growth  (Dev  2008;  Sen  and   Himanshu   2003;
Dholakia 2003; Patnaik  2000;  Ghosh  1995;  Bharadwaj.  1982)  The  debate  on  interstate
growth trends has been summarised as:
the low income and poorly performance major states of  Uttar  Pradesh,  Madhya
Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa and Assam, have not only persisted with their low  growth
syndrome but have also experienced further deceleration in  growth  rates  in  the
1990s… It is for this reason that, despite an improvement in the growth  rates  on
many  middle  income  states,  the  degree  of  dispersion   in   growth   rates   as
measured  by  the  coefficient  of  variation  (cv)   has   widened   in   the   1990s.
(Economic and Political Weekly Research Foundation 2004: 26)
Similar disturbing trends were seen in  terms  of  per  capita  income.  The  gap  between
poorer and richer  regions  has  grown  in  recent  years.  Per  capita  average  income  in
western states was 3.8 times that of eastern states in 2000. Further, all the  seven  states
in the less developed regions have a per capita income below the national average, while
all eight states in developed states have a per capita income above the national average.
The incomes of the  poor  states  grew  at  lower  rates  than  national  average  and  also
population growth was significantly higher in these states as  compared  to  richer  states.
Indeed, the per capita income growth in real terms for Bihar  state  was  negligible  during
the last decade. It seems the gap between developed and less developed states in  India
has widened during the last  decade.  Indeed,  in  respect  of  certain  other  indicators  of
economic prosperity like availability of  telephone,  public  transport,  and  communication
etc. the gaps have widened even further. (Kurian 2002)
We will argue that the  neglect  in  primary  education  will  have  important  future  consequences
because inequalities in primary education translate into inefficiency, as well as  further  inequality,
in  the  use  of  new  economic  opportunities.  The  state  failure   to   take   initiative   to   remove
educational backwardness ultimately may restrict the overall  scale  of  expansion  of  skill-
related modern production and also hinder to attract FDI, which is an important  factor  to
the success of neoliberal economic reform.
On the question of poverty, Utsa Patnaik (2007) has shown that neo- liberal policies have had  an
adverse  impact  on  poverty.  She  questioned  the  poverty  estimation  of  the  National  Sample
Survey data which, according to her, underestimates rural poverty in India.  The  Indian  Planning
Commission claims that rural poverty  has  declined  from  37.3  percent  to  27.4  percent  of  the
population  between  1993/94  and  1999/2000.  4  The  World   Bank’s   World   Development
Report, 2006 presents a figure of 30.2 percent poverty rate for latter  date.  The  National
Sample Survey of the 61st round, 2004/05 data, has estimated rural poverty to be at 28.5
percent.
Moreover, according to Patnaik, ‘the  available  official  data  show  that  for  the  same  period,  a
number  of  interrelated  indicators  of  the  rural  well-off    have   worsened;   rural   development
expenditures have gone down as a share of the national product and in real per capita  terms;  all
India crop growth rates have halved in the 1990s compared to the  1980s  and  food-grain  output
has stagnated over the last five years; rural employment growth has  dropped  sharply  and  open
unemployment  has  been  growing  fast.  Bank  credits  to  farmers  have  declined   and   higher
dependence on private usurious credit, combined with severe price declines for many crops,  has
led large segments of farmers into a debt trap.  Food-grains  absorption  per  head  has  declined
sharply to reach levels prevalent 50 years ago. Rising farm debt  has  led  to  the  loss  of  assets
reflected in rise of landlessness.  All these indicators of general depression, combined with  acute
distress in specific regions, are  quite  inconsistent  with  the  claims  of  decline  or  constancy  of
poverty.’ (Patnaik, 2007) 5  This proposition may seem strange  since  India  has  witnessed
about seven percent GDP annual growth rates.
However, the overall growth rate figures can be misleading, as  they  tells  us  nothing  about  the
sectoral composition of growth or its  distributional  effects.  For  instance,  more  rapid  structural
shifts in the sectoral contribution to  GDP  have  taken  place  than  in  any  previous  period.  The
manufacturing sectors’ share in GDP has stagnated in the last 15 years while  its  contribution  to
employment has declined. On the other hand share of agriculture and  allied  industry  has  fallen
sharply. The peak production of food-grain output of 112 million tons has stagnated over  the  last
six years and per capita output is falling sharply. Moreover, with increasing use  of  land  for  non-
agricultural purposes such as supermarkets, motor ways, golf clubs,  and  recreation  centres  for
elites, the gross farmland  area  sown  has  remained  static  since  1991.  This  means  that  only
through increases in yields can output growth be maintained. The growth  in  yields,  however,  is
declining.  In  the  past,  agriculture  universities  played  a  major  role  in  developing  new   crop
varieties, but now cuts in  state  funding  are  adversely  affecting  their  research  activities.  The
matter  is   complicated   by   government-deflating   expenditure   policies,   which   have
adversely affected the purchasing power of rural inhabitants.
Conclusion
This article has questioned some assertions concerning neoliberal  reforms,  growth  and
poverty in India. Contrary to wide belief that India’s growth acceleration  has  taken  place
mainly  due  to  changes  in  the  government’s  attitudes  towards  business  and   export
orientation rather than earlier domestic  policies,  we  found  that  the  turnaround  growth
took place in the early 1980s rather than the early  1990s  as  portrayed  by  international
financial institutions and media. Neo-liberal economic reforms were introduced in India  in
1991. 6 However, it seems that India’s  growth  acceleration  really  began  earlier,  in  the
1980s, which refutes the notion  that  ‘greater  openness  accelerates  economic  growth’.
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 Moreover, even after trade liberalisation, India’s average manufacturing tariffs remained
above  30  %,  and  are  still  at  approximately  20%.  Prior  to  l991,  India  protected   its
industries through more substantial tariffs.  8
The  post-independence  growth   rates   have   been   faster   than   pre-colonial   period.
Maddison  (1995),  a  prominent  British  economist,  estimated  the  growth  rates  during
colonial period. According to him, if the Indian economy continued to grow at  such  lower
rates then national income would have doubled in 87 years where as  per  capita  income
would  have  doubled  in  1750  years.  However,  the  GDP  growth  experience  of  post-
independent India was different, period from 1950 to 1980 meant that GDP  multiplied  by
2.86  while  GDP  per  capita  multiplied  by  1.5.  This  period  also  witnessed  a  rate  of
population growth which was more than 2 % per year. Of course growth  was  impressive
compared to near stagnation during colonial period. However, growth  as  not  enough  to
lift large number of people dire poverty.
The growth rates achieved on average from the period of 1980 to 2005, meant that GDP doubled
in just 12.5 years, where GDP per capita doubled in 20 years. The  growth  is  impressive,  which
led some to argue that growth is largely attributed to economic reform. However, the failure in the
second half of the 20th century, not in  growth,  but  country’s  inability  to  transform  growth
into development, which could radically alter the life of the poor people. The achievement
would not be complete as long as poverty and deprivation remains.  Moreover, it appears
that the trickle down process of growth has been  weak,  since  growth  is  not  located  in
sectors where  labour  is  concentrated  (for  example,  agriculture)  and  in  states  where
poverty is concentrated.
The argument that poverty has been reduced has been problematic.  We  also  examined  growth
and its impact on inter-sectoral and regional imbalances, despite the very optimistic views  of  the
proponents of  neoliberal  policies,  our  findings  are  contrary  to  their  expectations.  The  inter-
sectoral imbalances have increased further since the  adoption  of  neo-liberal  policies.  Also  the
importance of the manufacturing sector is not properly examined, which could play  an  important
role in creating jobs, and its crucial role  in  employment  generation  is  being  underplayed.  The
Indian economy has been growing around 7-8 % for the last two decades,  but  this  high  growth,
the manufacturing sector instead of drawing surplus labour force from the primary sector, is  itself
experiencing  a  downward  trend  in  labour  absorption.   So   the   government   and   neoliberal
economists over optimism has not realised. In 1991 total employment of both  public  and  private
sector was 26.73 million, which rose to 28.28 million in 1997. Since then it has been continuously
declining. In 2004 the figure was 26.4, which was 0.3 million less than in 1991 when liberalisation
was started. 
The regular employment in organised sector over the last decade i.e.  post-reform  period
increased at about 1 %, while the  GDP  was  increasing  around  7-8  %  per  annum.  In
contrast to this during the earlier decade when GDP annually grew only 4 %  per  annum,
regular employment grew 2 %. It appears that the drive  to  globalise  and  focus  towards
foreign markets led towards increased pressure on cost reduction to  make  our  products
competitive in international  markets.  This  means  hiring  less  workers  by  raising  their
productivity.  Much  of  the  FDI  inflows  into  India  concentrated  in  the  service   sector
(telecommunications in particular) in response to liberalisation policies designed to attract
FDI, such as easing ownership restrictions.
Indian economy achieved high growth rates in post-reform  period.  The  average  growth
rates of GDP in the last 15 years have been around 8  %  per  annum.  Despite  this,  the
most populous  states,  namely  the  Hindi-speaking  region  of  north  and  central  India,
continue  to  represent  the  least  economic  developed  region  of  India.  The   available
estimates  suggest  that  more  than  one-third  of  Indian  population  live  in   sub-human
poverty. A recent estimate puts about 42 % of India’s  population  as  absolutely  poor  by
international  standard.  Nearly  half  of   the   children   are   under-nourished   and   food
deprivation in the rural areas has not decreased.
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